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## ART. VI. — HUNGARY AND ROUMANIA.

SOME twenty years ago, in the full flush of European revolutions, and again shortly before that dark deed which brought about the downfall of republican freedom in France, the name of Hungary was, if I mistake not, a household word among the people of the United States, a romantic as well as a political interest having attached itself to that "War of Independence" round whose heroes and martyrs even the writers of contemporary history, in general so critically inclined, had already cast a poetic halo.

Lord Palmerston, when called upon to recognize Hungarian independence, replied that he knew only an "Austrian Empire"; but the United States were not indisposed to enter into relations of international amity with the new commonwealth. To the United States it was owing that those Magyar exiles who had found a shelter, though clogged with restrictions on their personal freedom, on Turkish soil, were not kept for an indefinite time in such confinement as would have suited the purposes of the Czar and the Kaiser, but were released and enabled to enjoy the welcome offered them by free nations. In the belief that the vicissitudes of fortune which Hungary has since experienced, and her position and prospects now that she has re-attained self-government in a constitutional, if not in the more complete democratic form, will have an interest for Americans, I shall give some account of the political resurrection of the Hungarian realm, as well as of the perils which yet surround it, in consequence of its relations to what is called the "Eastern question."

When Lord Palmerston said, in 1849, that he knew no Hungary, but only an "Austrian Empire," he repeated the phrase he had used some eighteen or nineteen years before, on the occasion of the Polish war of independence. Then he had declared that he knew no Poland, but only "Russian dominions." In the mouth of one whom it was the fashion with ultra-conservatives to style "Lord Firebrand," that expression may have seemed strange enough; but I believe it could be explained, after all, by his earlier relations with Mus-

covite diplomacy, though such an explanation would reflect little credit on the memory of that able and powerful, but unprincipled statesman. At all events, he was guilty of a fallacy both in the case of the "Kingdom of Poland" and in that of Hungary, when endeavoring to make those countries appear simply as provinces of the respective "empires" governed by the houses of Romanoff and Habsburg. Even poor, crushed Poland, partitioned as she had been among three powers, had yet preserved some signs of national life and some distinct institutions of her own. In that part of Poland which was joined to Russia, the Constitution of 1815, engrafted upon that of 1791, established representative government, there being then two houses of parliament and a responsible ministry, as well as a separate army organization, the monarch having the title of "King of Poland," and the administration being carried on, during his absence, by a viceroy. The rising which began at Warsaw on November 29, 1830, and which soon assumed the proportions of a war, could therefore under no circumstances be regarded as a simple revolt of a "province" against an "empire." It was the movement of a distinct nation against an oppressive ruler, who, from the fact of his standing at the head also of another nation of vast military resources, was able to crush the feebler, freedom-loving power.

So it was with Hungary. Although under the same rulers as the other countries comprised in the "Austrian Empire," Hungary, down to 1849, had been a separate kingdom as regarded its constitution and the tenure of the royal power; the confines of the realm were clearly marked, and its territory was girdled by a *cordon* of custom-houses, which formed a commercial division, in addition to the political one, between the countries on the two sides of the boundary line. A "province" of the "Austrian Empire," Hungary therefore was not. The very name of *Kaiserthum* or *Kaiser-Staat*, as applied to Austria, only dates from the beginning of the present century, when Francis was compelled, through the misfortunes of war in the struggle against Napoleon, to lay down his imperial German dignity, which had become a mere shadow, and thereupon, as a slight solace, assumed the title of Austrian Emperor, or Kaiser. Constitutionally speaking, Hungary was not affected

thereby. For Hungary, the Austrian emperor remained simply a "king," though in some undefined way he had provided himself with an additional title, which the folly of men is wont to regard as an appellation superior to that of "king."

Having boundaries, representative institutions, and a government of its own, though connected by dynastic and other relations with Austria proper, Hungary, in 1848-49, first strove to improve its Constitution in the sense of greater parliamentary freedom and of political equality among the various races that dwell within the realm. Royalty was not to be done away with, but only to be restricted in its privileges. Before resorting to the "extreme" step of taking the management of their affairs into their own hands, nations generally require some act of intolerable oppression or treachery to be committed against them by their rulers. It was the double-dealing policy of the Habsburgs that drove the Hungarians into a war, during which the reigning house was declared to have forfeited its rights; the way being thus paved for the establishment of a republic, had it not been that the rising liberties of the people were crushed under the weight of a double military attack from abroad, combined with reactionary movements fostered by Imperial statecraft within.

The character of a mere "province" of the "Austrian Empire," which Lord Palmerston falsely attributed to Hungary, at a time when she seemed destined to acquire full independence, was in reality imposed upon that country through the sad issue of the war. In return for the declaration resolved upon at Debreczin, which pronounced the forfeiture of the "crown of St. Stephen" by the house of Habsburg-Lorraine, the Kaiser now declared the Hungarians to have forfeited their autonomy and their constitution through the fact of the rebellion. It was done on the *Verwirkungs-Theorie*, to use the special phraseology of Imperial officials. Henceforth Hungary was to be governed according to the pleasure of the monarch, the whole machinery of representative institutions, both in state affairs and in local matters, having been abolished by a stroke of the pen, or rather of the sword. "*Car tel est notre plaisir*" — that haughty expression of Norman-French despotism, which even yet lingers in the official inter-

course between the English Crown and its Parliament, though the spirit of government in England has fortunately changed for the better — was to be made a harsh truth in the once self-governed Magyar realm.

Then, for the first time, arose that Imperialist doctrine which would not acknowledge any longer the distinctions between the several component parts of the “Austrian Empire,” — distinctions which are so broadly stamped upon them either by the differences of national character or by the influence of historical grouping. There was to be a “centralized Austria” under the black-yellow flag, held together by the iron bands of arbitrary rule, with no trace of national rights or popular liberties left standing. Robert Blum, Messenhauser, and the other champions of German democracy, were in their bloody graves at Vienna. On the gallows at Arad the hangman of his Imperial, Royal, and Apostolic Majesty had strung up eminent Magyar generals and statesmen by the dozen. In Italy the work of oppression was completed by numberless court-martial fusillades. There was consequently no impediment to the fulfilment of the Kaiser’s desires. At least so it appeared for a time to the cabinet politicians of Vienna.

Yet the scheme of triumphant tyranny would not work. In the face of their victor, — who, the better to mark the relation in which he stood to the people of his capital, would never (from 1848 down to 1860) appear in public in any other than military garb, — the Viennese preserved an attitude of sullenness the more galling to the court because it formed so strong a contrast to the good-natured and forgiving temper of that pleasure-loving but withal free-minded population. Year after year passed by, but the Viennese would still remember their martyrs. Theirs is the only town in Europe which can boast of a monument worthy of the champions of the popular cause that fell in the street fights of the early part of 1848. It is a granite obelisk, towering aloft like a colossal finger of warning. To the honor of the Viennese be it said that, at the very time when oppression was rampant, they matured the proposition for the erection of that noble memorial. Nay, when the government, on being applied to by the communal council, refused to allow a suitable inscription to be placed on

the pedestal, the “assembled fathers” of the town resolved by a formal decree to refrain from adding any inscription at all, “until it could be done in proper form at a more propitious time.”

Even as the people of Vienna would not be weaned from their liberal aspirations, so the Lombards and Venetians would not abandon their eager desire for a junction with their Italian brethren. Against the Italians, it is true, so long as they were unaided by foreign forces, the Court of Vienna was able to avail itself not only of a commanding strategic position and a large military array, but also of the superior martial prowess of its non-Italian subjects. Nor must it be forgotten that, in the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, national tendencies were scarcely to be found beyond the urban populations and the better part of the “upper classes”; whilst the peasantry, animated by class hatred against the *signori*, and attracted in some degree to Austrian rule by a well-devised system of impartial justice in minor social matters, looked rather coldly upon the plans of deliverance formed by the democratic party of action, as well as by the more cautious and astute Piedmontese politicians. Since in Italy, as on the Continent in general, the agricultural class forms the vast majority, in fact more than two thirds, of the aggregate population, it is easy to see that Imperial rule had, after all, to deal only with a very small, though active, minority, which it was not difficult to overawe by a constant display of military force. The fact of the indifference, nay, in many cases, the positive antagonism, of the peasantry to the national tendencies of the more enlightened classes, has been testified to me by the two chief leaders of the Italian popular party. The nickname of “*Austriacanti*” was therefore often applied to the peasants, as well as to the time-serving or unpatriotic members of the higher ranks. Even during the war of 1859 many peasants were found ready to succor the Austrian soldiery on its retreat. It was a state of things similar to that which prevailed in many provinces formerly Polish, where the patriotic aspirations of the towns and of the more progressive nobility also found themselves checked, during a time of insurrection, by the sullen indifference of a class which, from the remembrance of long-standing griev-

ances, is of a somewhat suspicious disposition, and therefore, as a rule, little inclined to co-operate heartily with the people of the towns.

So it was also in Galicia, the Polish province under Habsburg sway. There class hatred was embittered even more by an artificially fanned antagonism of race. In Galicia, the population belong partly to the Polish race, properly so called, partly to the "Ruthenian" stem, which holds an intermediate position between the Poles, or "Lechs," and the Russians. Spreading over Lithuania, Podolia, Volhynia, Galicia, and Northern Hungary, the Ruthenians, according to their territorial position and the extent of their intercourse with their immediate neighbors, approach in speech and tendencies the Poles or the Russians, and may consequently, in an ethnological as well as in a political sense, be considered to occupy in a great measure a debatable ground. Those of them who are located in Galicia occupy the central portions of the province, around the capital, the Poles proper dwelling in the eastern and the western districts. This distribution of races, together with the class feuds between the peasantry and the aristocracy, enabled Metternich, in 1846, to quell a patriotic Polish movement in Galicia by a cruel massacre, in which the notorious Syela played an infamous part. It was a deed the more hideous and hateful because, even from the point of view of Austrian diplomacy, a reconstituted Poland would be a desirable consummation, as it would afford a shield against the aggressive tendencies of Russian Panslavism. But though the Ruthenians, since 1846, have frequently been opposed by monarchical statecraft to their brethren, the Poles, the idea of Polish independence could not be vanquished even in Galicia. Hence this too, like the aspirations of the Lombards and Venetians, formed a bar against the establishment of a Centralized Austria.

In an even greater degree was this the case in Hungary. That country could be vanquished, kept down by the bayonet; but its political parties, with remarkable unanimity, would not hear of any political fusion with the other dominions of the house of Habsburg. There is, in that polyglot country, — which has within its precincts races differing as much as the Turks do from the Prussians, or the Italians from the Dutch, — a

wonderfully strong national spirit, the growth of a common historical development, against which the strength even of a Joseph II. failed, though he called ideas of progress to his aid, in his attempt to overcome aristocratic privilege in the interest of a more impartial, but nevertheless overbearing, monarchical rule. Hungary, during the popular struggles of 1848-49, was often called a "nationality." That appellation has, with many public writers and speakers, clung to it; but in point of fact it is a misnomer. Hungary is certainly not a nationality, in the sense in which we speak of an Italian, a German, a French, or even a Polish nationality. It is rather a compound of "nationalities"; and yet it has an unmistakable character of its own, which stands out in bold relief and explains in a great degree the vitality of its political constitution and the fruitlessness of the attempts made for its overthrow.

Austria has been called a Europe *in nuce*. The German, the Slavonic, the Romanic, and the Ugrian races are represented in it, besides various odd fragments of tribes heterogeneously huddled together in some nooks and corners, as stray remnants and sediments of the migration drifts. What is true of Austria as a whole is even more true of Hungary and its so-called *annexes*. When we look back into history, we find Dacians, Bastarnæ, Getæ, Illyrians, Pæonians, Sarmatæ, Iazyges, Vandals, Bulgarians, Alans, Avars, Huns, Suevi, Quadi, Marcomanni, Gepidæ, Longobardi, Goths, Slavonians of different denominations, Khayars, Wallachians, and last, but not least, Magyars — a people belonging to the same stock as the Fins and the Turks — successively sweeping into what to-day, after the "Ugrian" or "Ungrian" tribe of the Magyars, is called Hungary. There are other European countries that have been visited by a nearly equal succession of discordant tribes. But the East of Europe — Hungary and Turkey — have preserved the strongest traces of such national dissimilarity. In some respects, various parts of Hungary are even worse off on this score than certain Turkish provinces. There are districts in which every claim of one race is contested by half a dozen other races.

Hungary is inhabited at present by the central Magyar race, which is mainly settled on the plains; by different Sla-



vonian populations, chiefly inhabiting the more mountainous parts, but stretching also, in greater or lesser compactness, along the northern, western, and southern parts of the circumference; by the German race, which has spread along that great artery, the Danube, and through the towns in general; and by the Rouman, or Wallachian, race which is scattered over the eastern districts, where it touches, through Transylvania, the cognate population of the Danubian principalities. Transylvania, which the Hungarians insist on considering as part of their own country, as it covers their eastern flank by the smaller Carpathian range, is inhabited by a majority of Rouman-speaking but somewhat uncultivated people; the political strength, social power, industry, and intellect being chiefly represented by the Magyars, the Szeklers, — a people of Magyar descent, — and the “Saxon nation,” — a German population settled there since the early centuries of our era.

In a numerical sense, every race may be said to be in a minority in Hungary. The Magyars, counting between five and six millions, are pretty well offset by the Slavonians, taking these latter in the bulk. However, as the Slavonians are somewhat scattered around the circumference of the kingdom, whereas the Magyars occupy a more concentrated position in the middle; and as the former are, moreover, split up into a number of tribes, — namely, Slovaks, Croats, Rascians, Schokaczes, Wends, Ruthenians, and others, — who lack a common medium of understanding, their different languages being still in the state of simple dialects; the Magyar nation has naturally a position of greater influence, even in intellectual matters. The chief source of progress in this respect, as well as in industrial affairs, is however the neighboring German nation, whose pioneers of civilization have penetrated into what, by the more ambitious among them, has sometimes been called their Colonial Department in the East. Altogether, the German population of Hungary may be reckoned at about two millions. It lives, fortunately, on the whole, on terms of good fellowship with the Magyar element, there being even a tendency among the German immigrants and settlers to Magyarize themselves in their family names, so that, under not a few strange-sounding names, a “Müller,” “Schulze,” or “Pfannenschmied” is

hidden. Upwards of two millions of Roumans occupy the greater portion of Transylvania, and are loosely scattered over the districts between that principality and the river Theiss. Politically disfranchised under the old Magyar constitution, which treated them contemptuously as the *plebs Valachorum*, they have, in some notable cases, been made use of as instruments for convulsing Hungary in the Imperial interest, for which part their low state of civilization — into which, it is true, they had been thrown by aristocratic misrule — eminently fitted them.

Shall I also mention the medley of Arnauts, Bulgarians, Armenians, Gypsy clans, and so forth, which goes to make up the full aggregate of the Hungarian population? Be it enough to say, that it would be difficult to conceive a more variegated hodgepodge of “nationalities” and tribes than are to be found thrown together, in “the happy-family” fashion, between the Carpathian range and the Danube.

But the strong state-forming power of the Magyars has given to the whole population a tone and a character of its own. With all that variety of races and tongues, which rendered it advisable down to quite recent times to use Latin as the official and parliamentary language, the Hungarian commonwealth had most distinctive features, and was imbued with a spirit difficult to tame down to the requirements of a levelling monarchical bureaucracy. Hence Hungary has been able to outlive terrible disasters brought upon her from without and worse internal dangers. Never have the latter been more trying to the cohesion of the realm than in the period immediately previous to the misfortune of Vilagos. Battling for independence and liberty against the house of Austria, the Magyars were assailed from within by local counter-insurrections, in which the fierce passions of hostile races, kindled by despotic guile, ran riot at the expense of that freedom which all might have enjoyed. Thus the Revolution had been internally undermined before it fell under the weight of the combined armies of the Kaiser and the Czar. But even that sad experience could not break the spirit of the Magyar nation. The great capacity for self-government which that Eastern race, whose origin is to be traced to a nomadic chivalry, had displayed in an equal degree with nations boasting of

an Anglo-Saxon descent, was still powerful enough to make the Hungarians bear up against the discouragement of the time.

The attempt made by Prince Schwarzenberg, after 1849, to compel them to yield a ready obedience to the rule of the sword, failed miserably. So did the more liberal, but still anti-Hungarian, policy of Herr von Schmerling, who endeavored to found a centralized Austria on the constitutional principle. At a first glance there was something specious and captivating in this latter scheme. To many it seemed but natural that the various "antiquated" institutions of the different populations of Austria should be altogether discarded, and a new fundamental law, on the modern representative pattern, set up in their stead, proclaiming uniformity of civic rights, irrespective of national history and distinctions of race. It was a plan which almost necessarily won the assent of the great industrial interests of the German provinces of Austria,—interests everywhere impatient of restrictions on their activity. To the great manufacturers, the mere idea of a possible return to a state of things under which a custom's line might be restored between Hungary and the other dominions of the dynasty appeared utterly preposterous. Their sympathies were therefore easily enlisted on the side of the Schmerling constitution.

On the other hand, it was easy to see that if that constitution were finally adopted, there was an end of the long-dreamed-of reconstitution of a United Italy, and an Independent Poland, not to speak of German Unity, which can never be complete without those Austrian provinces that have for so many centuries formed part of the Fatherland,—first under the Empire, and then under the Bund, or Federal League, which replaced it. At the same time, the Hungarians, priding themselves on a constitution nearly a thousand years old, would not receive from the hands and by the sovereign pleasure of a monarch that which they considered their imprescriptible right. A constitution thus arbitrarily bestowed might be arbitrarily taken away. The Hungarian idea of a constitution was that of a compact, or covenant, somewhat like the ancient Arragonese constitution; the king being only considered a lawful king after having sworn to observe the national fundamental law, and only remaining a lawful king so long as he observed his part of the

compact. The Schmerling notion of a constitution was that of a convenient machinery for raising money and passing enactments, with no "right of resistance" to illegal royal and imperial procedures attached to it. There was a radical divergence between the two opinions. If the Liberals of the Schmerling school asserted that the new Austrian constitution was in many respects more progressive than the old Hungarian statute, the Magyars replied, with some show of reason, that progress was best wrought out and secured by the free resolution of a people, and that, moreover, they did not mean simply to return to the old constitution of their country, such as it was before 1848, but that they intended to accept also the "amended laws" of that year of progress.

On the continued refusal of the Hungarians to send deputies to the new "Reichsrath" at Vienna, Herr von Schmerling uttered the haughty expression, "*We can afford to wait for them!*" Events have proved that the Hungarians could afford to wait for the downfall of the Schmerling ministry. The manœuvres which that able but crafty statesman employed in order to bend the Hungarians to his designs will be in the recollection of many readers. They were the same as those which had been employed during the Revolution of 1849. Whilst in Galicia the unscrupulous minister made use of the Ruthenian peasantry for the furtherance of his Austrian centralization scheme, he threatened the Magyars with the rekindling of separatist movements, and contrived to induce the Transylvanian Diet, in which a majority of Rouman deputies was assembled, to send delegates to the Reichsrath. In this way he meant to surround, and circumvent the Magyar population, overpower it with a coalition of secessionist elements, and compel it to sue for mercy.

This plan, also, failed; the triumph remained with the intended victims. To the undaunted perseverance of the Liberal Magyar leaders; not less than to the favor of unexpected events which broke the pride of the Imperial family, the success of the constitutional movement, of which Francis Deak was the most prominent representative, is to be attributed. To-day Hungary has once more its ancient frontiers, its time-honored fundamental law, modified by the reforms of 1848. Its ruler, after

having taken a special coronation oath, is recognized only as king. The name of Hungary is placed, in all state documents, on equal terms with that of Austria proper. The Honveds, who fought against the Kaiser, are acknowledged as having merited well of the country. The rank of General is given back to Klapka, Perczel, and Vetter, once among the military heads of what in the Hofburg was called a rebellion. In short, the restoration of liberty is wellnigh as complete as it could possibly be under a royal *régime*. A few steps further would place Hungary in the condition of full independence she seemed destined to enjoy at the time of her glorious struggle.

Even the most thorough-going advocates of independence, with very few exceptions, are, however, unwilling, under present circumstances, to hurry on matters in that direction. They see rocks ahead, and will not risk shipwreck by venturing too far. What I have stated above in reference to the multifarious races with which the country is dotted over, and among which the Sclavonians and Roumans are somewhat infected with secessionist dispositions, will explain this cautious behavior of even radical Magyar politicians. In the East, — in which Hungary may well be included, — race plays a greater part than is consistent with sound political principle. At the gate of Hungary stands an overgrown but still aggressive power, — Russia, — which in 1849 effected the final overthrow of the Revolution through the army led by Paskewitsch. Russia aims at the absorption of the vast countries that separate her from the Mediterranean and the Adriatic. In her eager desire to prepare them for annexation, she carries on a propagandism, founded on alleged consanguinity as well as on similarity of religious creed. The Sclavonian tribes scattered through Hungary and Turkey are thus allured to unite under a common national banner, though in reality they differ as much from the Russians, and from each other, as the Germans, Danes, Norwegians, Swedes, Dutch, and English, all of whom belong to the Germanic stock, differ from one another. The Greek Church is equally used as an engine of propagandism by Russia. The Greek Church numbers among its members not only many millions in Turkey, but also several millions on Transylvanian and Hungarian soil. The importance of this fact was recognized

in the so-called "Last Will of Peter I.," — a forged paper, no doubt, as I have stated in a previous article, — not less fictitious than the famous exclamation of "*Finis Poloniae!*" wrongly attributed to Kosciusko, — but still containing maxims on which the successive rulers of Russia have evidently acted.

It is the fear of Russia which induces the Magyar statesmen to refrain from steps which might become fatal to the vitality of their commonwealth. What is at present called the "extreme left" in their Diet is chiefly composed of men who work under cover for separatist ends. In the districts inhabited by a Rouman and Servian speaking population these pseudo-radicals have just carried a number of elections, whilst in the Magyar, German, nay, even in the Slovak and Croat districts, the party favorable to Hungarian union has triumphed. Those who fail to perceive the character of this secessionist undercurrent are deceived by party denominations. There are members of the "left" who aim at detaching Transylvania and the Servian Banat from Hungary; others who, under the guise of a "Danubian Confederation" scheme, would swamp the Magyar nation by the addition of large numbers of a Slavonian-speaking population from Northern Turkey.

Against both these plans the leading liberal and radical politicians are on their guard. Not even the name of Kossuth — who, unfortunately, has changed his political views as regards Hungary so entirely that he has actually gainsaid everything he stated when on his great tour through the United States — has been able to lend any lustre to that "Danubian Confederation" plan. It is denounced as got up in the Russian interest; and in the heated discussions which have latterly taken place upon the subject, it was brought to recollection that, towards the close of the Hungarian revolution, Kossuth had proposed to offer the crown of the country to a prince of the imperial family of Russia! Nor can this fact be explained away; for the very documents containing the proposal have been published, and their authenticity is not denied. If the proposition was not urged any further at that time, it was because events moved too quickly, and the subjection of Hungary by Russian arms had been accomplished before the offer alluded to could be properly made at the Russian head-quarters.

I have only referred to these matters as affording a key to the unwillingness undoubtedly existing among the vast majority of Hungarian politicians of all parties to adopt the counsels now and then vouchsafed them from a quarter to which formerly the best men of the country looked up with confidence.

The fact of the elections having gone against Hungarian union in the districts where a Rouman and Servian population is in a majority proves that there the "Eastern question" exercises an influence — a question of incalculable importance to the security of all Europe. The Rouman leaders at Bukarest, of the Bratiano stamp, and the Servian enemies of the Magyar realm, wish to cut up Hungary, the former demanding the whole country as far as the river Theiss. I have before me a curious correspondence, published at Paris in 1851, between Mr. D. Bratiano and a Hungarian exile of the name of Iranyi. In it the aims of the pan-Rouman propaganda are already openly avowed, the writer in the Rouman interest choosing the form of a republican profession of faith, in order to render his doctrines acceptable to the French public. It was at a time when France still lived in appearance under republican institutions, the *coup d'état* of Louis Napoleon not having yet been perpetrated. On the strength of that republican profession of faith, Mr. Bratiano subsequently belonged, for a while, to the "Central European Democratic Committee" at London, of which Mazzini and Ledru Rollin were members. Suddenly changing sides, however, the brothers Bratiano entered into relations with the French government, and, on the overthrow of the usurper Couza in the Danubian Principalities, brought about the election of Prince Karl of Hohenzollern to the throne of what is at present called "United Roumania." Since then, the Bratiano party, which formerly professed an undying hatred of Russia, have been frequently accused of underhand dealings with the government at St. Petersburg in a sense detrimental to Hungarian territorial integrity. Facts have come to light, showing that the Danubian Principalities may indeed be regarded as the centre of that movement which aims simultaneously at the disruption of Hungary and Turkey, thus endeavoring to deal a blow alike at a re-established free state

and at a stationary Oriental rule which is an impediment to certain schemes of aggression. It is this unfortunate connection which places all thoughtful friends of progress in such a sad dilemma, when called upon to side with one or the other party on the "Eastern question."

It may be useful to cast a glance here at the early attempts of the Czars to obtain influence in the Danubian Principalities. Ottoman supremacy over Moldavia and Wallachia had been established in 1393, by the treaty of Nicopoli, between Sultan Bajazet I. and Myrtche I., of Moldavia. It was sixty years before Constantinople even had become a Turkish city. At first the treaties stipulated for a mere Ottoman protectorate. The course of events converted it into a more substantial suzerainty, which gradually approached a complete sovereignty. Soon, however, attempts were made at a reconquest of independence on the part of the rulers of Moldavia and Wallachia, who strove to use the privileges left to them for throwing off the Turkish yoke. It is at that epoch we find the Czar of Moscow already casting a wistful glance on the Danubian provinces. Ivan III. — the same who married the niece of the last Byzantine Emperor — is known to have entertained decided notions respecting a claim of his own to the inheritance of "Eastern Rome"; and in furtherance of that object he allied his house and his political interests with Moldavia. The successors of Ivan also kept their attention fixed on the Danube.

Now the Turks, acting upon the maxim that Constantinople must be protected at the Danube, took the opportunity of a victory gained by them over the insurgent Wallachians to convert Wallachia into a Turkish pashalik. On their part, the Moldo-Wallachians became more and more accustomed to look to Russia as an ally. It was during the war begun in 1710 that Peter I. made overtures to the hospodars to secure them as confederates against Turkey. To Dmitri Cantimir he offered to render the princely dignity hereditary in his family, and to place his successors forever under Russian protection. Dmitri Cantimir eagerly closed with this proposal. In the treaty thereupon concluded, he was styled "Most Serene Highness, Lord and Sole Master of Moldavia, Confederate (*Col-ligator*) of Russia." A similar engagement was drawn up



between Peter I. and the Wallachian prince. Both hospodars then invited the Czar to enter their country with his army, and, when he had crossed the Pruth, assisted him to the best of their ability against Turkey. Peter, however, having been surrounded by the Turks, very nearly fell into the hands of his enemies, and owed his personal safety only to the circumstance of his mistress and future Czarina, Catherine, having bribed the vizier in command of the Ottoman troops.

From those days, Russian governments have steadily kept their eyes on Moldo-Wallachia. Already in 1772 Catherine II. proposed, at Foksani, to render the Danubian provinces independent. The project was shelved at that time. In the deliberations preceding the treaty of Kudjuk-Kainardji, in 1774, Russia repeated her demands. She ostensibly paraded the right of those countries to a national administration of their own, and contrived to obtain for the hospodars the title of "sovereigns," as well as the privilege of being represented at Constantinople by diplomatic agents. At the same time she took good care to assure to herself the important right of interference, under cover of guaranteeing the constitution of the Principalities against Turkey.

The annexation of the Crimea offers in this connection a lesson which may well be studied to-day. When, towards the end of the last century, Catherine I. was bent upon gaining a footing on the Black Sea, one of her first acts tending to this end was to favor the movement then made in the Crimea for forming that peninsula into an independent kingdom. Taking advantage of the jealousy the Khans of the Crimea felt towards their Ottoman suzerain, the Russian government espoused the cause of the Tauric Tartars, and thus contrived to bring about a severance of the ties which for centuries had bound the peninsula to Constantinople. Consequently, in the peace of 1774, the Crimea was acknowledged as an independent realm, — "*dependent only upon God*," according to the Russian wording. The people of the peninsula were henceforward to govern themselves "freely." Such were the stipulations imposed by Russia upon the Porte. Many misguided Liberals even extolled the magnanimity of the Czarina.

A few years more passed by, and the wily designs of Catherine were disclosed. The Crimea, unable by its own force to resist the pressure of Russia, and unaided by the armies of her former suzerain, fell, in 1787, an easy prey to the Northern invader. Thus ended an "independence," the establishment of which had been so pompously heralded !

It was a favorite idea of Catherine II. to create such "independent" states. Witness her scheme for the establishment of "independent Hellenic republics," under a Russian protectorate. In this latter plan, it is true, she met with a decided failure. The insurrection she caused Alexis Orloff to foster in the Peloponnesus by means of Muscovite agents, dressed as Greek priests, utterly miscarried. Had it been otherwise, a repetition of the Crimean game would have been the probable result.

Every step taken by the Autocrats, in reference to the Danubian Principalities, since the end of the last century, was an effort to convert the hospodars from vassals of the Porte into subjects of the Muscovite protector. Sometimes Russia worked in this behalf by mere diplomatic intrigue ; sometimes by military invasion ; sometimes by getting up sham insurrections, such as that of Ypsilanti, in 1821. The influence she acquired after the war of 1829 brought her very near to the accomplishment of her long-cherished ambition.

In proportion as the Czars consolidated their influence in the Principalities, they gradually dropped the idea of Moldo-Wallachian independence, only laboring for that of their own protectorship. Thus, in 1848, we find the Emperor Nicholas pronouncing himself, in a note written in the most violent terms, against the foundation of an independent and free Roumania, which had been the object of the revolution at Bukarest. The interest the Czars felt in the scheme of "independence" only lasted so long as they were able to direct the movement.

The policy of Russia in this matter, as in others, was always one of expediency. For the moment, not seeing her way to annexation, she is satisfied with setting the Roumans against the Magyars. The consolidation of either of these states — the one of quite recent formation, the other only just restored to its autonomy — is to be impeded, and passions are roused

which, it is no doubt hoped at St. Petersburg, will one day so convulse both Hungary and the Principalities as to place them at the mercy of a stronger neighbor.

I may here say a few words as to the social condition of Moldo-Wallachia, and the political consequences resulting therefrom.

"A middle class," so wrote one of the most zealous defenders of Rouman independence some years ago, when the Principalities had not yet acquired their present autonomy, — "a middle class has scarcely begun to form itself in Moldo-Wallachia." We have, therefore, to look mainly at the peasantry and the aristocracy. Now, unfortunately, the most numerous class, that which constitutes the bulk of the population, namely, the peasants, are deeply sunk in ignorance and superstition. They are under the thumb of their clergy; and that clergy has frequently enough shown Russian leanings. Of the noble families, the majority owe their very rise to the former Muscovite protectorate; and of the spirit which animates many members of the Polish and Hungarian nobility, nothing is to be found amongst them.

There remains, consequently, only a party of lesser boyards, and the population, numerically somewhat insignificant, of a few towns, in whom patriotic and liberal sentiments are to be met with. This will explain how the upstart Couza could so easily overthrow a state of comparative freedom, by dissolving the National Assembly in Napoleonic fashion, and then appealing to the suffrage of brutish masses, to whom, partly, gross baits were held out, or who were not intelligent enough to see the real case at issue. For several years Couza thus held sway, aping his Parisian model. Great was the sorrow of real patriots in the Principalities when they saw the very source of progress thus poisoned.

Nothing remained for them but to resort to an agitation against the usurper in public opinion abroad, and to prepare in the mean while a plan for his sudden capture and overthrow at Bukarest. The emissaries of the Liberal party of the Principalities, who were sent to Western Europe for the purpose of influencing governments to look favorably on the cause of right, had a most unsatisfactory reception. Lord Palmerston

gave the cold shoulder to the confidential envoy that approached him with a message. I vividly remember the expressions of sorrowful indignation which the latter used before me when he came back from that hopeless interview.

However, the secret plan for the overthrow of the tyrant had better luck. It sufficed that a party of determined men, who had gained over his body-guard, appeared one night suddenly before his bed, presenting pistols at his head, to bring about his speedy abdication. I believe those who formed the original plan for the deliverance of the country had no idea of calling a Hohenzollern prince to the vacated throne, but were rather bent upon the establishment of true freedom. This, at any rate, was the notion of that excellent man, — himself a cabinet minister of Couza before the latter had turned usurper, — Mr. Pano, who had filled at London and Paris the post of confidential envoy of the Rouman Liberal party during the time immediately preceding Couza's downfall. It was through him that exiled Italian, German, and French democrats were kept informed of what was quietly being prepared. Unfortunately he was not to see the dawn of freedom that appeared after Couza had been ejected. But neither had he the galling pain of seeing his country made once more the instrument of despotic intrigues. The last I heard of him was through the head physician of a well-known asylum near Vienna, where he had been placed, and where, a little later, he died in a state of mental aberration. Who knows whether sorrow at seeing the promising Liberal movement among his compatriots gradually thwarted by the elements which an aggressive absolutism had set in motion did not darken that intellect before so bright and lucid.

Hungarians, as well as Roumans of the United Principalities, might at present do much for the freedom of the East if that unfruitful quarrel of races were dropped. But the men of the Bratiano party still heap upon the Magyars the most galling insults, pronouncing them "intruders from Asia," who might, without injustice, be driven out into the wilderness from whence they came, and taunting them with "barbarism," because their ancestors formed a nomadic chivalry, whilst they, the Roumans, are, forsooth, the descendants of

the ancient Latin race, — that is to say, if we keep to historical truth, of the inhabitants of a penal settlement of the Roman Empire! As if we Europeans had not all successively come from Asia, a little earlier or a little later! The Hungarians, no doubt, were among the last arrivals; and Germans, who here had to suffer much from them at a time when they were yet a rude race, might be least expected to be partial to them. But must not good sense teach us to give up all invidious distinctions in presence of claims well made out by noble struggles for self-government? After all, that Magyar race had established on the banks of the Danube a sort of “British Constitution,” even before the time when England had attained to proper parliamentary government, thus practically contradicting a superficial race theory which is at present too much in vogue.

If, on the other hand, we were to inquire into the Moldo-Wallachian claim to a classic origin, it would be easy enough to show, judging the question ethnologically, that the thinly sown Latin race of the ancient Dacians became, in the centuries immediately following the fall of the Roman Empire, so swallowed up in the invasions of Goths, Kumans, Petchenegs, and a flood of Tartar tribes, that any remnants of the original Roman element must have been completely remoulded. The Principalities have always served as one of the great gateways through which the tide of migrations flowed. Each wave of that human ocean left its impress. Thus the “purity of the pedigree” of the Moldo-Wallachian population is rather doubtful. Whilst antiquarian research may exercise its ingenuity upon the subject, the politician will dismiss the ethnological claim at once, and only take into consideration the urgent political events of the epoch, which unquestionably point to the necessity of maintaining Hungary as a unit.

I cannot do better, in concluding, than refer to the discourse which Louis Kossuth delivered in New York in December, 1851, and which is printed in the edition of his collected speeches under the title, “On Nationalities.” This speech was made at a dinner of the press, presided over by Mr. Bryant, the poet. Treating of the relation of the Magyars to the other races of Hungary, Kossuth said that “no word

has been more misrepresented than the word 'nationality,' which is become in the hands of absolutism a dangerous weapon against liberty. . . . If language alone makes a nation, then there is no great nation on earth: for there is no country whose population is counted by millions but speaks more than one language. . . . But on the European continent there unhappily has grown up a school which bound the idea of nationality to the idea of language only, and joined political pretensions to it. . . . This idea, if it were not impracticable, would be a curse to humanity, a death-blow to civilization and progress, and throw back mankind by centuries. It would be an eternal source of strife and war. . . . Nothing but despotism would rise out of such a fanatical strife of all mankind."

Then, after having denounced those who would "claim from Hungary to divide its territory, . . . to cut off our right hand, Transylvania, and to give it up to the neighboring Wallachia; to cut out, like Shylock, one pound of our very breast,—the Banat, and the rich country between the Danube and Theiss,—to augment by it Turkish Servia," Kossuth continued: "It is the new ambition of conquest, but an easy conquest, not by arms but by language. So much I know, at least, that this absurd idea cannot, and will not, be advocated by any man here in the United States, which did not open its hospitable shores to humanity, and greet the flocking millions of emigrants with the right of a citizen, in order that the Union may be cut to pieces, and even your single States divided into new-framed independent countries, according to languages."

"And do you know, gentlemen," the orator went on to say, "whence this absurd idea sprang up on the Continent? It was the idea of Panslavism,—that is, the idea that the mighty stock of Slavonic races is called to rule the world, as once the Roman did. It was a Russian plot; it was a dark design to make out of national feelings a tool to Russian preponderance over the world."

At that time the exiled Hungarian leader spoke and acted in accordance with the views of the best elements of his nation. With his later changes I have here nothing to do. On the question of "Hungarian Nationality," the most progressive

men of his country still adhere to the opinions he then gave utterance to,—opinions founded in the very nature of things existing in that peculiar Eastern region. It is not by shaking such a complicated, but still necessary, political edifice as Hungary to the ground that freedom can be promoted. It is rather by raising up again those bulwarks of European security which an encroaching autocracy has contrived to throw down through intrigue and brute force. Commonwealths like those of Hungary and the Danubian Principalities ought to join hands in such a work. To venture upon deadly strife with each other can only bring about for both of them the fate which has befallen unhappy Poland.

KARL BLIND.

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ART. VII.—1. *A History of the Intellectual Development of Europe.* By JOHN WILLIAM DRAPER, M. D., LL. D. New York. 1863.

2. *Ancient Law; its Connection with the Early History of Society, and its Relation to Modern Ideas.* By HENRY SUMNER MAINE. London. 1863.

EVERY attempt to discover the laws to which social changes conform must run great risk of being frustrated by the mere immensity of the mass of details which the investigator strives to arrange in orderly sequence. Seemingly numberless as are the phenomena dealt with by the physical sciences, they bear no proportion, either in multitude or in variety, to the facts upon which the historical inquirer must build his scientific theorems. Facts concerning man in his physical relations to soil, climate, food, and the configuration of the earth, blend with facts concerning the intellectual and moral relations of men to each other and to the aspects of nature by which they are surrounded, making up a problem of such manifold and multiform complexity, that it may well have long been deemed incapable of satisfactory solution. The fit subject of wonder is, indeed, not that we are as yet unable to arrive at accurate prevision